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Abstract 
This paper aims to identify what determines the allowance transactions of energy firms on the 
European carbon market (EU ETS). We develop measures of their 'autarky' regarding the carbon 
market, their allowance hedging, and the allowance holdings which ensure optimal EU ETS 
compliance. Although under-allocated over Phase I, energy firms held more allowances than needed. 
By selling allowances, only the non-autarkic firms followed their optimal compliance holdings and, 
hence, actually behaved autarkical. Autarkic firms, conversely, purchased more allowances than they 
needed. Moreover, and unlike non-autarkic firms, their allowance trades were responsive to energy 
demand and indicative of carbon hedging. Finally, all energy firms utilized the carbon market's 
abatement potential, which affirms that the EU ETS leads to relative cost savings. As especially 
autarkic energy firms utilized this potential, and may have reaped additional savings from their active 
hedging, they behaved least autarkical regarding the carbon market. 
Keywords 
Emissions trading ; energy market ; EU Transaction Log ; firm-level data ; allowance purchases and 
sales ; carbon hedging ; panel data econometrics 
JEL codes: D22 ; H23 ; L94 ; Q41 ; Q52 
1. Introduction1
The European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched in 2005
in order to cost-eﬀectively reduce greenhouse gases from several industry sectors. The
mechanism behind the EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system, where the 'cap' is the aggregate
sum of the EU Member States' emissions reduction targets, and the subsequent 'trade'
in allowances underlying the cap is left to the market.
Recent research shows that only few ﬁrms traded carbon allowances during EU ETS
Phase I (2005-2007) (see e.g. Martino and Trotignon (2013), Zaklan (2013), Jarait
e and
Kaºukauskas (2012), and Jong et al. (2014)). The energy sector was 'forced' to trade
allowances as it was the only `under-allocated' sector (i.e. it needed more allowances to
cover its emissions than it received in allowance allocations).2 Energy ﬁrms are therefore
expected to only purchase allowances for covering these shortfalls. However, transactions
from the EU Transaction Log (EUTL) indicate that most energy ﬁrms both bought and
sold allowances. Some adjustments to these allowance holdings must have been carried
out due to changes in the carbon contents of production. For example, increases in gas
prices may increase demand for allowances because higher gas prices make coal, being
more carbon-intensive than gas, relatively cheap in the production of energy. Other
allowance holdings adjustments may relate to the cost minimization of compliance, in-
cluding the hedging of carbon allowances. So far, however, there is no empirical literature
analysing the actual allowance trading of energy ﬁrms, the key drivers, and their relative
importance. The aim of this paper is therefore to ﬁll this literature gap by analysing
both energy market and energy ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, the resulting range of factors
1Thijs Jong's research has been ﬁnanced by the Energy Delta Gas Research (EDGaR) program.
EDGaR is co-ﬁnanced by the Northern Netherlands Provinces, the European Fund for Regional Devel-
opment, the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs, Agriculture and Innovation and the Province of
Groningen. We are grateful for the useful comments we received from Oscar Couwenberg, Edwin O.
Fischer, Henryk Gurgul, Michael Murg, Matthias Pachler, Herwig Pilaj, Stefan P. Schleicher, and Edwin
Woerdman. Any remaining errors are our own.
2EU Member States made energy ﬁrms short on allowances, as they are considered able to cost-
eﬀectively abate pollution through fuel switching, and as they do not compete on an international market
(see e.g. Ellerman et al. (2007), Part I).
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of which enables us to obtain an integrated account of their allowance trade behaviour
towards the EU ETS.
The central question of this paper is: which EU ETS and energy industry factors
determined the allowance amounts traded by energy ﬁrms over EU ETS Phase I?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on allowance trading
incentives for energy ﬁrms, and formulates hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the method-
ological framework and variables deﬁnitions. The descriptive statistics are presented in
Section 4, while the empirical results are provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Why ﬁrms trade
In general, the incentive to trade allowances depends on the gains ﬁrms expect to
attain vis-à-vis the opportunity costs of not trading (e.g. of abating pollution or keeping
unused allowances in stock). The beneﬁts and costs to trade may be aﬀected by several
institutional constraints, ranging from tradeability restrictions, restrictions on banking
and borrowing, diﬀerent allocation methods, regulatory uncertainty regarding the future
allowance cap, transaction costs regarding monitoring, as well as information, search and
bargaining costs. Speciﬁcally, Hanemann (2010) outlines two main features with regard
to allowance trade incentives. The ﬁrst is what is called 'autarky' (Kreutzer (2006)):
ﬁrms ﬁrst cut emissions, borrow from future allocations, or exchange allowances between
subsidiaries before they opt for the market. The second feature is that ﬁrms are typically
allowed to store or 'bank' their allowances within and/or between compliance periods,
which enables them to smooth ﬁrm-speciﬁc or market shocks over time.3
This 'autarkic' behaviour is also observed for the EU ETS energy industry. Jarait
e and
Di Maria (2012) show that the introduction of the EU ETS led the energy sector to abate
emissions. Furthermore, Alberola and Gloaguen (2013) assert that not the EU carbon
3Only EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007) allowances could not be banked towards later Phases.
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targets, but mainly those on renewables and energy eﬃciency led to emission reductions,
although fewer emission reductions would have taken place without the carbon price
in place. Also the borrowing and intra-ﬁrm exchange of allowances is indicative of the
energy sector's autarkic behaviour. The sector is shown to have borrowed most from its
subsequent allocations (Jong et al. (2014)), and ﬁrms in the combustion (i.e. energy)
sector were most likely to trade between their subsidiaries, and the more so when ﬁrms
were larger (Jarait
e and Kaºukauskas (2012); Zaklan (2013)).4
We postulate that, within the energy industry, cost-minimizing ﬁrms behave autar-
kical if they can ﬂexibly adjust their carbon-intensity of production. Advantageous for
energy ﬁrms in managing their carbon-intensity is that both parts of this ratio can be
adjusted. This is more feasible if ﬁrms control more and diverse production sources,
as it allows them to spread the same production over diﬀerent numbers of installations
and/or over diﬀerent fuel-sourced installations (i.e. fuel switching). Hence, not only will
pollution abatement be facilitated, but also the pooling, borrowing, and/or banking of
allowances within ﬁrm boundaries, so that the carbon market will only be used for any
remaining allowance demand or supply.
Furthermore, as energy production is volatile and typically planned months or even
years in advance, derivative markets play a key role in managing these risks. As carbon
pollution has become part of a ﬁrm's production costs, also carbon risks would need to
be hedged for.56 Indeed, and based on the reasoning in Smith Jr. (2008), ﬁrms are more
likely to hedge on the market when they have fewer possibilities within ﬁrm boundaries to
smooth their carbon-related costs; in other words, when they cannot behave autarkical.
4EU ETS Directive 2003/87/EC allows (de facto) borrowing of allowances, as the next calendar year's
allocation will be received (in February) before the current year's allowances need to be surrendered (in
April).
5The possibility to bank allowances is one of the main conditions for carbon derivatives (see e.g.
Maeda (2004)). Indeed, allowance banking has been an eﬃcient strategy to reduce compliance costs (e.g.
Ellerman and Montero (2007))
6Yet, due to the (resulting) volatile and discontinuous behaviour of the carbon price, hedging struc-
tures can unexpectedly lose their optimality (Daskalakis et al. (2009)). Carbon hedging structures thus
depend on the selected time-frames and market prices.
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However, empirical literature on EU ﬁrms' autarkic behaviour as well as their carbon
allowance banking and hedging behaviour is almost non-existent.7 The main reason is
that, besides allocations and emissions, allowance transactions data are needed to obtain
estimates on the allowance banks, hedges, and (therefore) the self-suﬃciency or autarkic
stance vis-à-vis the carbon market. This transaction data is diﬃcult to obtain from the
EUTL and it is not at ﬁrm-level, while it is provided with a time delay.8 Much of the
carbon market literature is therefore predominantly based on allocations and emissions
only, thereby disregarding trade-behavioural aspects on the carbon proﬁle of ﬁrms. This
shortcoming is more pressing since the energy sector had the largest share of inter-ﬁrm
trade in the EU ETS (Jong et al. (2014)). The literature is therefore scarce what the
optimal allowance holdings are, and whether these optimal holdings are actually followed
by ﬁrms subject to emissions trading schemes.
This paper ﬁlls a gap by analysing both energy market and energy ﬁrm-speciﬁc char-
acteristics, the resulting range of factors of which enables us to obtain an integrated
account of their behaviour towards the EU ETS. We hypothesize that cost-minimizing
ﬁrms ﬁrst try to behave 'autarkical' by smoothing production and emissions and, hence,
carbon costs within ﬁrm boundaries, which means that ﬁrms will trade and hedge less
on the carbon market. The subsequent hypothesis is that over time, and towards the
end of Phase I, ﬁrms follow their 'compliance trajectory': by adjusting their allowance
holdings to minimize any diﬀerences between their allocations and emissions. Finally, we
include factors capturing the ﬁnancial aspect of allowance trades. As a result, this paper
contributes to the understanding of carbon and energy market linkages at both micro
7Most literature analysing changes in the allowance holdings of ﬁrms focuses on US emissions trading
schemes. Examples of ﬁndings are that SO2 allowance holdings are responsive to future changes in
the cap (Ellerman and Montero (2007)). Firms with higher SO2 pollution rates maintain relatively
more allowances for precautionary purposes (Rousse and Sevi (2007)). Allowance holdings respond as
expected to the convenience yield, and to price diﬀerences between low and high-sulphur coal (Considine
and Larson (2006)). However, plant owners did not appear to take full advantage of the available cost
savings the SO2 allowance market oﬀered (Swinton (2004)).
8This delay used to be 5 years, but a recent Commission Regulation (no. 389/2013) decreased it to
3 years. As Phase I allowances become void in Phase II, an analysis on Phase I is still useful as ﬁrms
are incentivized to round oﬀ their allowance holdings.
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and macro-levels. Both for policy-makers and the industry these insights will be crucial
for a better understanding of the functioning of the EU ETS.
3. Methodology
To accommodate for both time and ﬁrm eﬀects, we apply a panel model framework
as follows:
(1)Yi,t = βiXi,t + i,t
where subscript i stands for the individual ﬁrm, and t for the trading day; vector
Yi,t is the dependent variable capturing the daily amounts traded (Section 3.3); Xi,t
contains an intercept, time dummies, and three groups of determinants: 1) those aﬀecting
production and emissions (Section 3.4), 2) trade and hedging (Section 3.5), and 3) the
compliance trajectory (Section 3.6). i,t contains the idiosyncratic shocks νi,t, and may
contain unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects µi.
3.1. Data clustering
Next to tackling the ﬁxed eﬀects via the panel model framework, we account for ﬁrm
heterogeneity via subgroups based on indicators of autarkic behaviour and the ﬁrms'
trade frequency. For both we apply an additional indicator, in order to check whether
these subgroups are properly deﬁned (Appendix A.4 provides details on the density of
ﬁrms over these subgroup combinations). All four indicators are turned into dummies,
where indicator-values above the sample median equal 1, and 0 otherwise. The two trade
frequency indicators are applied as subsets and, within these subsets, the two autarky
indicators are applied as interaction terms. Depending on the regression ﬁts, we will
subsequently select one of the two autarky indicators.
Through the trade frequency subset, we aim to expose diﬀerences in allowance trade
incentives. The ﬁrst indicator we consider is the trade dispersion (DISPi), which is the
ﬁrm's average Phase I allowance trade divided by its Phase I total amount exchanged.
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As frequent traders have more dispersed trades, their DISPi-values approach 0. For
infrequent traders, DISPi approaches one. Moreover, as electricity ﬁrms are among the
most active on the carbon market (e.g. Jong et al. (2014)), for the additional indicator
we constructed a dummy (ELECi) equalling 1 if ﬁrms control at least one electricity
installation, and 0 otherwise. The non-electricity ﬁrms are active in the remaining part
of the electricity value chain, such as fuel extraction, and the trade and transport of
energy.9 For the remainder of the text, references to "energy" ﬁrms will encompass both
electricity and non-electricity ﬁrms.
We further conjecture that ﬁrms behave autarkical if they can ﬂexibly adjust their
carbon-intensity (cf. Section 2). We constructed a composite indicator (ENDOWi) from
a set of constant and/or annual variables aﬀecting the ﬁrms' carbon-intensity (more de-
tails can be found in Appendix A.3). Expected is that autarkic behaviour is more likely,
and ENDOWi will be larger in value, if ﬁrms are more endowed: by owning more domes-
tic and foreign installations, by having more electricity and non-electricity subsidiaries
within their conglomerates, more heterogeneous fuel inputs, and larger market shares
and carbon intensities. Finally, as large ﬁrms are likely to behave autarkical, for the
additional indicator we use the ﬁrms' (natural logarithm) asset size (SIZEi).
3.2. Deﬁnition of the ﬁrm
As no information is available at what level allowance trade is managed within ﬁrms
(e.g. centralized or decentralized), any allowance management structure we assume may
be correct for some ﬁrms but inadequate for others.10 We aggregated ﬁrm-speciﬁc data
9Our selection of industry classiﬁcation (NACE)-codes are the following. (1) 'coal': 'Mining of hard
coal', 'Mining of lignite', and 'Extraction of peat'; (2) 'electricity': 'Electric power generation, transmis-
sion and distribution', 'Production of electricity', 'Transmission of electricity', 'Distribution of electricity',
'Trade of electricity', and 'Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply'; (3) 'gas': 'Electricity, gas,
steam and air conditioning supply', 'Extraction of natural gas', 'Manufacture of gas; distribution of
gaseous fuels through mains', 'Manufacture of gas', 'Distribution of gaseous fuels through mains', 'Trade
of gas through mains', and 'Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas'; (4) 'petroleum': 'Extraction
of crude petroleum', and 'Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas'; (5) 'uranium': 'Mining of
uranium and thorium ores', and 'Processing of nuclear fuel'; and (6) 'other': 'Steam and air conditioning
supply', 'Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products', and 'Transport via pipeline'.
10Future research may be needed to show the impacts on these industry-structure trade-oﬀs.
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over the following two 'dimensions': 1) per country, and 2) per Global Ultimate Owner
(GUO).11 The reasoning for the country level is that EU ETS compliance is a national
matter, and that most EU electricity markets are national. And as to the GUO-level, we
consider it more likely that subsidiaries within the same country had a (nationally) coor-
dinated allowance management rather than a decentralized one.1213 To indicate whether
trades took place within GUOs, so that ﬁrms pool resources and thus behave autarkical,
we create the dummy SAMEGUOi,t equalling 1 if ﬁrms trade among subsidiaries, and 0
if otherwise.
3.3. Construction of trade variable
For the allowance trade variable, we take the daily net trades and, to stabilize the
variance, transform these through the natural logarithm.14 The dependent variable is
thus as follows:
TRADEi,t

= 0 if Wi,t = 0
= sign (Wi,t) · ln (|Wi,t|) if Wi,t 6= 0
(2)
where Wi,t = PURCHi,t − SELLi,t, and where PURCHi,t and SELLi,t are the al-
lowance purchases and sales of ﬁrm i at time t.
11GUOs are the 'ultimate' shareholders by controlling at least 50,01% of shares. With the Bureau
van Dijk (BvD) database codes, the GUOs can be requested.
12An example resulting from this two-level merge is that the UK subsidiary (i.e. the country) of GDF
SUEZ (i.e. the GUO) contains all domestic energy production and UK-registered allowance trade from
International Power Ltd. (and others, such as Cofely District Energy Ltd.). In the sample, GDF SUEZ
operates in 13 EU Member States. It therefore has 13 of such "separate" country-GUO entities.
13Furthermore, of the total number of identiﬁed ﬁrms (1549), 227 ﬁrms did not trade and were left
out of the sample. They had been identiﬁed as they had at least one installation in the EU ETS National
Allocation Plans. The regressions in Section 5 omit these ﬁrms automatically.
14As ﬁrms are aggregated at the national and GUO-level (cf. Section sec:ﬁrmdef), allowance trades
between national GUO-subsidiaries are netted out.
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3.4. Production and emission-related determinants
As electricity demand is at least partially uncertain, also the ﬁrms' allowance de-
mand will be. With more installations, it is expected that autarkic ﬁrms are better able
to meet electricity demand changes. To capture this production eﬀect, we include the
current monthly electricity demand (EDEMi,t), its change with respect to the previous
month (∆LEDEMi,t), and the future month (∆FEDEMi,t).
15 Moreover, by having
more diverse fuel-sourced installations, autarkic ﬁrms are expected to be better able at
switching fuels. The propensity for switching fossil fuels is approached via the coal and
gas price diﬀerence: SPREADt = ln(COALt −GASt). We further interact SPREADt
with BROWNi,t, the fossil fuels share in electricity production, to get BSPREADi,t.
Fuel-switching is then more likely to occur with larger fuel price diﬀerences, and with
higher fossil fuel proportions in the production of electricity.16
3.5. Trade and hedge-related determinants
Meeting the allowance demand from production and emissions can be costly if carbon
price and volume risks are not accounted for. Hedging of these risks can minimize the
adverse eﬀects on the ﬁrms' optimal production decisions (e.g. Smith Jr. (2008)). To
capture the ﬁnancial drivers of carbon trading, we selected three variables. First, the 'cost
of carry arbitrage' (CCAt) is a proxy for arbitrage opportunities. CCAt is the diﬀerence
between the time-discounted carbon futures price minus the spot price, and reﬂects the
opportunity costs of keeping allowances. If positive (negative), it is proﬁtable to keep
(sell) allowances, and hedge the risks on the derivatives market. CCAt may expose risk-
free arbitrage possibilities, especially when the carbon market was relatively immature.
Second, BSSt is a trade proxy on market timing. BSSt is the diﬀerence between the
current carbon spot price and its 30-day moving average. If correctly followed, ﬁrms
15Daily electricity demand from ENTSO-E is available only from 2006. Furthermore, monthly data
smoothes the volatile and non-linear nature of daily electricity production.
16Lacking the exact composition of fossil fuels at installation and (therefore) ﬁrm level, the switching
price could not be estimated (e.g. as in Bertrand (2012)).
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should sell (purchase) allowances with positive (negative) spreads of BSSt. Third, the
'bi-directional'-index (BDINDEXi,t) is a proxy for the trade direction. While TRADEi,t
shows the daily net trade of a ﬁrm, BDINDEXi,t captures whether this daily trade came
about through purchases, sales, or a combination of both. BDINDEXi,t is deﬁned as
follows:
BDINDEXi,t

PURCHi,t/Qi,t if PURCHi,t > SELLi,t
0 if PURCHi,t = SELLi,t
0 if PURCHi,t = SELLi,t = 0
(−1) ∗ SELLi,t/Qi,t if PURCHi,t < SELLi,t
(3)
where Qi,t = |PURCHi,t|+|SELLi,t|. BDINDEXi,t reﬂects the proportion of pur-
chases, PURCHi,t/Qi,t over the positive ranges (0, 0.5) and (0.5, 1], the proportion of
sales, SELLi,t/Qi,t over the negative ranges [−1, 0.5) and (−0.5, 0), and equals zero if
PURCHi,t = SELLi,t or no trades occurred. In the terminology of Smith and Swierzbin-
ski (2007), trades are 'uni-directional' or 'bi-directional' if BDINDEXi,t approaches −1
and +1 or approaches 0, respectively. Although we are limited in inferring whether ﬁrms
hedge or not, we consider that 'bi-directional' traders are active at readjusting their
allowance positions which, as such, is indicative of hedging.
3.6. The compliance trajectory indicator
The sample runs towards the end of EU ETS Phase I, when Phase I allowances be-
came void for Phase II. We therefore consider that ﬁrms steer the trajectories of their
allowance holdings so that these minimize any diﬀerences in their allocations and emis-
sions. Indeed, ﬁrms having and therefore surrendering fewer allowances than emissions
will be penalized. And, ﬁrms should redeem their surplus allowances. In essence, these
compliance trajectories can thus be regarded as the outcome of a ﬁrm's production (and
emissions) activity, their internal (i.e. within-conglomerate) allowance pooling, carbon
trading and hedging, or a combination thereof. All these aspects are captured in the
9
EU Emissions Trading by Energy Firms
ﬁrms' management of their allowance holdings.
The only carbon allowance holdings estimates we found were in Martino and Trotignon
(2013) on EU ETS totals, and in Hintermann (2013) at the electricity ﬁrm level, where
both analyses concern Phase I, and are limited at the annual level. Hintermann (2013)
includes the Phase I allowance holdings of several EU power ﬁrms and considers that,
through excess holdings, ﬁrms may have forced upwards the carbon price in 2005 and
2006. Furthermore, Hintermann (2013) shows that most power ﬁrms gradually cut back
their holdings before the end of Phase I but, surprisingly, some built up or kept sizeable
amounts in stock. He considers some of these surpluses to be "too large for [them] to
be explained by hedging against carbon risk". While our analysis accounts for the ﬁrms'
trades and hedges, we do not test this conjecture as our focus is on the allowance trade
amounts rather than the size of their allowance holdings.17
The compliance trajectory indicator (LCTi,t) is based on four main allowance factors:
the emissions, allowances allocations, purchases, and sales. For the emissions we take the
veriﬁed sum of emissions over Phase I. A ﬁrm will be formally certain on its emissions
after an independent veriﬁer has drawn up a monitoring report after a calendar year
has passed. Given that energy production is typically booked ahead in future, we assume
ﬁrms are able to obtain a bandwidth in which the Phase I cumulative emissions would end
up. Based on these future emissions estimates, future allocations should be 'reasonably'
predictable through the terms as laid out in the National Allocation Plans (NAPs). We
therefore take the sum of the three allocations (to be) received over Phase I. It is up
to ﬁrms to minimize any diﬀerences between their allocations and emissions through
purchases and sales.
By construction, LCTi,t changes when ﬁrms trade allowances. Its lagged value is
therefore selected to capture whether deviations from the compliance trajectory incen-
17At the end of Phase I, carbon prices were very low. That these allowance surpluses could not be
transferred to the next EU ETS Phase may partly explain why ﬁrms held too many allowances.
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tivize ﬁrms to trade allowances.18 LCTi,t is also deﬁned at the conglomerate level, to
prevent diverging values for ﬁrms pooling their allowances within conglomerates.
LCTi,t is constructed as follows:
LCTi,t

= 0 if Zj,t = 0
= sign (Zj,t) · ln (|Zj,t|) if Zj,t 6= 0
(4)
with
Zi,t =
J∑
i⊂j
[ALLOCi − EMISSi +
T∑
t=1
PURCHi,t −
T∑
t=1
SELLi,t] (5)
and where subscript j stands for the conglomerate which ﬁrm i is part of, the variables
ALLOCi and EMISSi represent ﬁrm i's sum of Phase I allocations and veriﬁed emissions,
respectively, and where
∑T
t=1 PURCHj,t and
∑T
t=1 SELLj,t are the cumulative allowance
purchases and sales from t = 0 to t.1920 LCTi,t = 0 is the benchmark or equilibrium
towards which ﬁrms are expected to move.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
We obtained data from diﬀerent sources: EUTL, ENTSO-E, Orbis, Thomson Reuters
Datastream, and Carma.org. Details on the construction of this dataset can be found in
Appendix A. Table I provides an overview and a short description of the determinants
as discussed in Section 3. This Section provides the descriptive statistics based on the
sample clustering, as discussed in Section 3.1.
Table II shows the descriptive statistics on TRADEi,t, LCTi,t, and the production
18This is analogous to Kerr and Maré (1999), where the trade decision depends on the trade value to
be gained minus the transaction costs.
19A ratio would be less useful for LCTi,t since the four main factors can take up zero or positive
values in all combinations. Also ﬁrms without allocations or emissions should have sold the allowances
they had in stock at the end of Phase I.
20LCTi,t implicitly takes allowance banking and borrowing into account.
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and emission-related determinants. The upper (lower) rows of the variables contain the
means and standard deviations of the less (more) endowed or small (large) ﬁrms. That
the TRADEi,t-averages are close to zero is mainly the result from the many non-trades,
but also from the fact that average purchases almost equalled average sales (not shown
here). In general, large and endowed ﬁrms are purchasers (i.e. TRADEi,t > 0); the small
and less endowed ones are sellers. Exceptions, however, are the non-dispersed traders and
the endowed non-electricity ﬁrms. Both groups sold about as much as their less-endowed
or smaller counterparts.
As the LCTi,t-values are positive for all subgroups, the sales of the small and less-
endowed ﬁrms, non-dispersed traders, and endowed non-electricity ﬁrms enable them
to redeem their superﬂuous allowances. In contrast, the large and endowed ﬁrms are
purchasing, and more than they need. They are thereby likely to trade allowances for
purposes other than compliance.
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Figure 1: Box-and-whisker plots of TRADEi,t over primary groups ELECi and DISPi, and secondary
groups ENDOWi and SIZEi.
Figure 1 plots TRADEi,t within the two trade frequency subsets (Panel A and B:
ELECi, Panel C and D: DISPi) and across the two autarky indicators (Panel A and C:
ENDOWi, Panel C and D: SIZEi). The darker-shaded box-plots encompass TRADEi,t
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of the less-endowed or small ﬁrms, while the lighter-shaded plots encompass the TRADEi,t
of endowed or large ﬁrms. Again, the pattern emerges that large and endowed (small and
less-endowed) ﬁrms are purchasers (sellers), and that the same three subgroup exceptions
are sellers rather than purchasers. Yet, the plots emphasize that SIZEi leads to clearer
subgroup distinctions than ENDOWi. For example, with the two SIZEi-subgroup ex-
ceptions, non-electricity (Panel B), and non-dispersed trade (Panel D), the interquartile
ranges only span the negative quadrant. They therefore primarily sold allowances. For
ENDOWi, in contrast, all subgroups purchased and sold allowances. This diﬀerence
arises, for example, for the non-electricity purchasers in Panels A and B. These ﬁrms'
majorities purchased among the large ﬁrms' subgroup, but sold in the endowed ﬁrms'
subgroup.
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Figure 2: Compliance trajectory (LCTi,t) over time based on subgroups: endowed vs. less endowed
(Panel A), small vs. large (Panel B), electricity vs. non-electricity ﬁrms (Panel C), and non-dispersed
vs. dispersed traders (Panel D).
Figure 2 plots the subgroup diﬀerences on LCTi,t over time. As mentioned above,
LCTi,t should converge to zero 1) to prevent penalties when having too few allowances
in stock, and 2) to redeem superﬂuous allowances. For ENDOWi (Panel A), small
ﬁrms (Panel B), non-electricity ﬁrms (Panel C), and DISPi (Panel D), LCTi,t converges
gradually, despite some LCTi,t-plateaus over the sample period considered (e.g. over
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2007). Diﬀerences in ENDOWi are (again) not pronounced, while they are salient for the
others. Interestingly, LCTi,t-levels of non-electricity ﬁrms and non-dispersed traders were
swiftly lowered in the last weeks of Phase I. Apparently, their ﬁnal Phase I demand became
certain, which triggered them to redeem their superﬂuous allowances. Yet, LCTi,t-levels
of large-sized and electricity ﬁrms ﬂuctuate around a value of 3, and hardly reduce their
allowance holdings.21
Table II further shows the production and emission-related determinants. As to the
fuel inputs used, we assumed all ﬁrms follow the same EU-wide gas and coal price indices.
This results in an equal average coal-gas price diﬀerential (SPREADt) for all ﬁrms
(3,776). BSPREADi,t, however, is generally larger for large and endowed ﬁrms. Being
a multiple of SPREADt and BROWNi,t, the large and endowed ﬁrms thus had higher
fossil fuel percentages for their electricity production.22 Moreover, no sizeable subset
diﬀerences can be observed for ∆LEDEMi,t and ∆FEDEMi,t, primarily because their
underlying data is country-speciﬁc. That large and endowed ﬁrms have larger EDEMi,t-
values may result from them operating in national markets with higher MWh-demands
(i.e. the larger EU Member States).
Table III shows the trade and hedging determinants. BSSt and CCAt do not diﬀer
over the subsets (i.e. as with SPREADt). These are EU-wide and assumed to be faced
by all ﬁrms. If BSSt is correctly followed, ﬁrms should sell (purchase) allowances with
positive (negative) spreads of BSSt. Given its negative value, the average signal has thus
been to purchase allowances. Moreover, the CCAt-averages are lower than the standard
deviations. This wide range of CCAt close to zero makes it likely that allowance arbitrage
did not always incentivize ﬁrms to trade. Moreover, BDINDEXi,t is positive for most
ENDOWi setups, but negative for most small ﬁrms. Interesting with BDINDEXi,t is
that the large and endowed ﬁrms' standard deviations are typically larger, and are paired
21Hintermann (2013) provides a discussion on this observation why, towards the end of Phase I,
electricity ﬁrms kept sizeable amounts of allowances in stock.
22By deﬁnition, BROWNi,t is missing for non-electricity ﬁrms. As we force BROWNi,t to zero for
these ﬁrms explains the BSPREADi,t-zeroes for the two non-electricity subsets.
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with higher means. These higher standard deviations are especially found for electricity
ﬁrms. By spanning far into the positive and negative ranges, these ﬁrms' trades are
likely to have served hedging purposes. Finally, SAMEGUOi,t is generally larger for the
large and endowed ﬁrms. That more intra-conglomerate trade is conducted among the
endowed or large ﬁrms accords with autarkic behaviour.
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Figure 3: Panel A shows electricity demand (EDEM), and the purchased amounts (PURCH) which
are dark (light)-shaded if CCAt > 0.05 (< 0.05). Panel B shows the bi-directional index (BDINDEX)
and the buy-and-sell signal (BSS). Panel C shows the within-conglomerate transactions (SAMEGUO),
and the interaction of the fossil fuel proportion with the coal-gas price spread (BSPREAD).
Figure 3 plots the trade and hedging-related determinants over time. Panel A shows
that allowance purchases (PURCH) follow three recurring patterns.23 First, volumes
spike at year's end: when carbon derivatives are exercised and ﬁrms need to ﬁle their
bookkeeping. Second, volumes take up gradually from January towards April when (pre-
vious calendar year's) allowance demand is veriﬁed, and allowances are exchanged before
the annual end-of-April allowance surrender deadline. Third, the plotted allowance vol-
umes generally move in tandem with (lagged) national electricity demand. For example,
allowance volumes are low during the third quartiles, when less electricity is required for
23The allowance sales follow a similar pattern (not shown in Figure 3).
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the summer months.24 The ﬁgure further shows that CCAt, which combines carbon spot
and futures prices, was signiﬁcant before April, 2006. After April, 2006, it became pub-
licly known that aggregate allowance demand was much lower than expected. This led to
a downfall of the carbon price (see e.g. Jong et al. (2014) and Zeitlberger and Brauneis
(2014)), and subsequent lower prices towards the end of Phase I. With CCAt lower than
0.05, transaction costs may prevent ﬁrms from exploiting arbitrage opportunities.
The BDINDEXi,t-spikes in Panel B of Figure 3 show that purchases and sales co-
move over time. This is the case even if BSSt, the buy-sell signal, revolves around
zero. Over 2007 and 2008, the BDINDEXi,t-spikes became gradually more responsive
to BSSt. Around that time, CCAt moved below 0.05, which may have led indicators as
BSSt to increase in importance.
Finally, Panel C of Figure 3 shows that SAMEGUOi,t and BSPREADi,t move
opposite to one another, which accords with autarkic behaviour. Gas price increases
(BSPREADi,t moves down) increase demand for allowances as coal, being more carbon-
intensive, becomes relatively more attractive. This higher allowance demand incentivizes
ﬁrms to pool their allowances internally (SAMEGUOi,t moves up).
5. Empirical results and discussion
While applying ENDOWi and SIZEi as interaction terms within the subsets of
ELECi and DISPi, the econometrics tests we ran point towards the use of panel data
models which account for autocorrelated, heteroskedastic, and panel-correlated structures
of the error term.25 We therefore selected a ﬁxed eﬀects model with Driscoll-Kraay
standard errors, and a random eﬀects model with panel-corrected Prais-Winsten standard
24During these months, trade activity is lower in general. Besides the April and December EU ETS
volume spikes, this pattern may also be driven by institutional factors.
25The Breusch-Pagan LM test rejected the pooled model, the panel data Wooldridge test for auto-
correlation rejected the null of no ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, while the modiﬁed Wald statistic rejected
the null of group-wise homoskedasticity.
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errors.26 If the Hausman test rejected the random eﬀects model, we selected the Driscoll-
Kraay ﬁxed eﬀects model, and the Prais-Winsten random eﬀects model if otherwise.27
Table IV shows the regression results. The lower rows (i.e. coeﬃcients (3b) to (16b))
contain the interaction terms for ﬁrms which are less endowed (columns 2 to 5) and small
(columns 6 to 9). These coeﬃcients indicate the average ENDOWi or SIZEi slope-
diﬀerences, relative to the base coeﬃcients (3a) to (16a). The intercept impacts from
ENDOWi or SIZEi (i.e. relative to the constant term) are provided by coeﬃcients (1)
and (2). Furthermore, the upper rows of Table V provide the joint signiﬁcance Wald tests
on the base and interaction terms, whereas the lower rows provide the joint signiﬁcance
Wald tests on the interaction terms only.
The match of the ﬁtted values with the dependent variable varies widely (R-squared:
from 0.248 to 0.648). As the lowest ﬁts are found for the electricity ﬁrms, their determi-
nants to trade may be based on diﬀerent or more reﬁned criteria. Furthermore, all setups
with SIZEi result in better R-squared values than with ENDOWi. This diﬀerence may
result from the more developed measurement of total assets (e.g. through accounting
standards).28 For the results discussion below, we opted for the SIZEi-interaction term.
Indirectly, this analysis will therefore contribute to the transaction costs literature, which
posits that both EU ETS implementation and trading costs are declining in ﬁrm size (e.g.
Jarait
e et al. (2010)).
5.1. Compliance trajectory
Since ﬁrms are expected to minimize their allowance holdings, positive (negative)
LCTi,t-values should initiate allowance sales (purchases). This eﬀect is captured with
26We also considered feasible generalized least squares models with correlated disturbances but, un-
fortunately, we abandoned it after Stata 12 was unable to provide results.
27As the Prais-Winsten model allows for diﬀerent autocorrelation structures, the ones with the best
R-squared ﬁts were selected. These autocorrelations are common- or panel-speciﬁc, and via time-series
or Durbin-Watson setups. For the Driscoll-Kraay models, the default lag order of autocorrelation was
selected.
28With future research, the ﬁt of ENDOWi may improve with diﬀerent underlying composite indicator
variables.
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negative LCTi,t-coeﬃcients signs. Table V indicates LCTi,t and LCT
2
i,t are signiﬁcant.
For large electricity ﬁrms, for example, LCTi,t decreases TRADEi,t with -0,001%.
29 But
due to the quadratic LCT 2i,t, LCTi,t changes sign when it crosses a value of −βLCT/(2 ∗
βLCT 2i,t) = −0, 5. It is intuitive that LCTi,t is negative over most of the negative quadrant,
as negative LCTi,t-levels result in non-compliance. Less intuitive is the accumulation of
allowance holdings after this threshold is reached.
Even if signiﬁcant, the small LCTi,t-values have low predictive impacts on the amounts
traded. In calculating LCTi,t, however, one possible weakness concerns the assumed ﬁxed
emissions. As emissions are likely to be a function of production, EDEMi,t may capture
part of the LCTi,t-variance.
5.2. Production and emissions
Overall, ﬁrms are expected to sell allowances if coal (gas) prices increase (decrease),
and more so if the fossil fuel percentage (BROWNi,t) in electricity production is larger.
Coeﬃcients should thus be negatively valued. Except for non-electricity ﬁrms whose
BROWNi,t and, therefore, BSPREADi,t is zero (cf. Table ??), SPREADt is posi-
tive and therefore contradicts this expectation. On average, allowance purchases are
conducted with coal (gas) price increases (decreases).30 Of further interest is that the
small ﬁrms' slopes are negative and small. Although outside the scope of this paper,
'delta hedging' may explain these trade behaviour diﬀerences regarding the gas and coal
prices.31 If small ﬁrms follow the expected approach, it may imply they have not ap-
plied this hedging technique. These observations on BSPREADi,t would thus actually
be relevant for the "Trade and hedging" section below.
Electricity demand is expected to be positively related to allowance purchases, as
29As TRADEi,t and LCTi,t are in logarithmic terms, the coeﬃcients need to be considered as elas-
ticities.
30The smaller coeﬃcient of BROWNi,t, albeit in line with expectations, will not make up for the
impact from SPREADt.
31We are grateful to Mohammed R. Osman for mentioning this hedging type after having attended
our presentation at the 2014 Energy Systems Conference in London.
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higher electricity demand necessitates more energy production and, hence, allowance de-
mand. The three electricity demand variables are only jointly signiﬁcant for the electricity
ﬁrms and the dispersed traders. Impacts from EDEMi,t also come from ∆LEDEMi,t and
∆FEDEMi,t, which impact EDEMi,t positively and negatively, respectively (cf. Table
I). EDEMi,t will then be positive for all setups, but negative yet small for small elec-
tricity ﬁrms. The latter coeﬃcient is relevant for allowance sales, as Figure 1 shows that
small ﬁrms were predominantly selling. It is thus likely that these ﬁrms took electricity
demand uptakes as opportunities to sell even more allowances.
5.3. Trade and hedging
Expected is that subgroups with BDINDEXi,t-coeﬃcients close to zero traded 'bi-
directionally'. If so, their trades will be indicative of hedging. In all setups, BDINDEXi,t-
slopes are positive, while more so for small ﬁrms, but less so for large ﬁrms and non-
dispersed traders.32 That non-dispersed traders trade bi-directionally is counter-intuitive,
and most likely results from BDINDEXi,t equalling zero for non-trades. To separate the
bi-directionality from the low-trade frequency, we use the Table III means and standard
deviations to calculate the covariances (not shown here). High standard deviations are
indicative of varied trades and, hence, bi-directionality. Although the large-sized non-
dispersed traders have high standard deviations, their covariances are among the lowest,
which likely results from their low trade frequencies. By pairing the covariances and
standard deviations, the dispersed traders and electricity ﬁrms subgroups rank highest,
a result in line with intuition.
If BSSt is correctly followed, ﬁrms should sell (purchase) allowances with positive
(negative) spreads of BSSt. BSSt is only signiﬁcant for non-electricity ﬁrms at a 95%-
conﬁdence level. The coeﬃcient is negative and positive yet small for large and small
ﬁrms, respectively. The large ﬁrms thus follow BSSt as conjectured. An explanation for
32By construction, BDINDEXi,t-slopes cannot be negative; if TRADEi,t is positive, the daily
amounts purchased dominate the amounts sold, which results in a positive BDINDEXi,t, and vice
versa. And, the sample only consists of ﬁrms which traded, so the slope cannot be zero.
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the small ﬁrms' positive coeﬃcient is that they were selling, while BSSt was predomi-
nantly negative.
Furthermore, expected for CCAt is that higher levels incentivize ﬁrms to trade with
risk-free arbitrage possibilities. Yet, this indicator did not signiﬁcantly impact any sub-
group within SIZEi, which may stem from the low CCAt-levels as of end-2006 (e.g. see
the discussion for Figure 3). That at the same time BSSt, a shorter-term trade indicator
than CCAt, became increasingly responsive is indicative of the carbon market becoming
more liquid and eﬃcient.
Further attested by their low BDINDEXi,t-values (and the possible delta-hedging
with SPREADt), the large ﬁrms, dispersed sellers, and electricity ﬁrms are thus most
active at allowance hedging. Being less restricted in autarky terms than small ﬁrms, they
would actually be expected to hedge less. Interesting for further research is whether the
trades by the small ﬁrms could have been more proﬁtable if they followed BSSt, and why
they did not follow it. It could be that they faced a steeper learning curve regarding the
carbon market (i.e. resulting in a lower BDINDEXi,t).
If ﬁrms are to behave autarkical, they are expected to purchase (sell) more within
their conglomerates than they are purchasing (selling). Given that all SAMEGUOi,t-
subgroups are signiﬁcant, we paired their TRADEi,t-averages (cf. Table II) with their
SAMEGUOi,t-regression coeﬃcients. We ﬁnd that the average impact of moving from
the subgroup SAMEGUOi,t-average to SAMEGUOi,t = 1 is always opposite to the
subgroup's TRADEi,t-average. In other words, if a subgroup's TRADEi,t-average is to
purchase, then it is selling within conglomerates, and vice versa.33 This result accords
with ﬁrms applying a centralized management in allocating their allowances. Yet, it
does not accord with autarkic behaviour, where additional allowances are purchased
from or sold to the carbon market. Since allowance trade is cost-eﬀective with more
33As discussed in Section 3.2, one of the impacts from aggregating ﬁrms at country-level is that
within-conglomerate trades occurring within the same country were netted out. SAMEGUOi,t may
thus change if a diﬀerent allowance management structure is assumed for the sample.
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heterogeneity in pollution abatement potential, one implication from this non-autarkic
behaviour may be that the abatement potential within conglomerates is lower than across
the carbon market. It may also be that within-conglomerate transaction costs hinder
ﬁrms in redeeming their mutual abatement heterogeneities (e.g. Stavins (1995)). The
coordination of abatement through the carbon market will then prove to be more cost-
eﬀective. This ﬁnding will then aﬃrm that, next to the US Acid Rain Program (e.g.
Ellerman et al. (2000)), the EU ETS leads to relative cost savings, for example, compared
to a command-and-control system.
The QUARTER dummies hardly corroborate the annual recurring patterns of Figure
3. Most base coeﬃcients are negative, so relative to the third quarter (i.e. the reference
group), large ﬁrms are selling more (e.g. as in Table II). Coeﬃcients are smaller or turn
positive through the interaction terms, implying that small ﬁrms sell less and/or purchase
relative to the third quarter. Finally, during the second quarter, relatively fewer sales
or more purchases take place. This result may be due to the second quarter containing
the month of April, during which allowances are surrendered for compliance with the EU
ETS.
6. Conclusion
Which EU ETS and energy industry factors determined the allowance amounts traded
by energy ﬁrms over EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007)? Expected is that cost-minimizing ﬁrms
ﬁrst try to behave 'autarkical' by smoothing production and emissions and, hence, carbon
costs within ﬁrm boundaries, which means that ﬁrms will trade and hedge less on the
carbon market. Relatively more purchases (sales) are then conducted across subsidiaries
than on the market. The subsequent expectation is that over time, and towards the
end of Phase I, ﬁrms follow their 'compliance trajectory'; by adjusting their allowance
holdings to minimize any diﬀerences between their allocations and emissions.
Through a sample of EU energy ﬁrms' production and emissions characteristics, al-
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lowance transactions, and carbon and energy market prices, the ﬁrms were divided into
subsets based on two trade frequency proxies: 1) whether ﬁrms conducted dispersed or
non-dispersed trades, and 2) produced electricity or not. To test for autarky-diﬀerences,
the variables were interacted with two indicators: a) endowed versus less endowed,
through a composite indicator on the number and diversity of installations, and b) small
versus large, based on asset size. By applying panel econometrics on these subgroups,
we tested for the allowance trade responsiveness to EU ETS and energy industry factors.
We selected the size-dichotomy as a proxy for autarkic behaviour, as it provided better
regression ﬁts.
First, our results show that, despite the electricity ﬁrms' under-allocations, all sub-
groups held more allowances than they needed, a likely result from the Phase I allowance
oversupply (or demand shortage). The carbon market activity of non-autarkic ﬁrms is
limited to selling oﬀ allowance surpluses. As such, they were actually following their com-
pliance trajectory and behaving autarkical. Not following this trajectory were the autar-
kic ﬁrms, both non-electricity and electricity ﬁrms, by purchasing more than they needed.
While precautionary purchases are understandable for electricity ﬁrms, which were made
short in allowances by their Member States, future research must therefore explain why
non-autarkic electricity ﬁrms were selling instead, and why autarkic non-electricity ﬁrms
were over-purchasing allowances as well. Second, especially these `over-purchasing' ﬁrms
were driven by other EU ETS factors. They followed national electricity demand, and
actively hedged on the carbon market. Opposite to expectations, electricity ﬁrms ob-
tained allowances during higher coal and/or lower gas prices. This result may be due
to (delta) hedging, an interesting conjecture for future research. Finally, all ﬁrms which
purchased (sold) allowances on the carbon market were selling (purchasing) within their
ﬁrm boundaries. This behaviour is not considered autarkic, and indicates that energy
ﬁrms have a centralized management of allocating allowances. It also indicates that the
abatement potential within conglomerates, especially in autarkic ﬁrms, may be higher
across the carbon market than within ﬁrm boundaries, or the coordination of abatement
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may be more cost-eﬀective through the carbon market. If so, this ﬁnding aﬃrms that the
EU ETS leads to relative cost savings, especially for the autarkic ﬁrms which may have
further reduced their costs by actively hedging on the carbon market.
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Appendix A. Supplemental information on the dataset
Appendix A.1. Sources of data and details on matching
First, we obtained the Phase I (2005-2007) National Allocation Plans (NAPs) and the
transactions from the European Transaction Log (EUTL). Most corporate owners of the
EUTL accounts were identiﬁed by the "Ownership Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset"
through their Bureau van Dijk's (BvD) company codes.34 Second, data on electricity
34This is a joint eﬀort by researchers from diﬀerent EU-based universities. The data set (Jarait
e
et al. (2013b)) as well as the technical report (Jarait
e et al. (2013a)) are available at the Climate Policy
Research Unit website of the European University Institute (EUI).
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production (in MWh) was obtained via Carma.org at installation level; the fuel inputs
percentages were only available at ﬁrm-level.35 And since Carma.org provides the 2004,
2009, and future electricity production, the installations' MWh-values over 2005 to 2007
were linearly extrapolated. Third, at BvD-level, we obtained the NACE Rev. 2 primary
and secondary codes. The codes and, hence, the ﬁrms were selected if they were active
in the electricity value chain (cf. footnote 9 in page 6). Aggregation of the variables was
then performed through country-GUO pairs (cf. Section 3.2).36 Moreover, GUO-country
ﬁrms were linked up with monthly national electricity demand, obtained via the ENTSO-
E country packages.37 The (EU-wide) time-series data is obtained from Datastream: the
gas price (London Natural Gas Index), carbon prices (EEX-EU spot, and ICE Phase I
average continuous futures ), and coal (Global Coal New Castle Index).
Appendix A.2. Limitations of EUTL data
Transactions from the EUTL are the settlements as recorded in the EU ETS allowance
registries. A limitation is that the EUTL only provides the names of the purchasing and
selling parties, the amounts settled, and the time-stamp of the settlement, but not the
underlying price and the nature of the contract. This makes it almost impossible to dis-
tinguish spot transactions from (Over-the-Counter (OTC) or exchange-based) derivatives
which initiated, intermediated, and ﬁnalized the EUTL settlements.38
Forwards and futures allow ﬁrms to ﬂexibly up or downgrade the exposure they con-
sider optimal. For example, exposure can be lowered by adjusting it with the corre-
sponding derivative positions (e.g. going long while maintaining an overall short posi-
35Carma.org provides the corporate owners of the installations. We have linked up these companies
with the BvD codes, as done with the EUTL accounts.
36The total assets are averaged over 2004-2009. More years are included than the sample scope (i.e.
Phase I) due to year gaps for several companies (e.g. only 2005 and 2007 but not 2006), or if the data
started later (e.g. at 2006 instead of 2005). Moreover, total assets could have been requested at the
GUO-level, but that would have incorporated asset values outside of the EU.
37ENTSO-E historical monthly data was not available for Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden.
38An indication on the delivery of futures can be obtained by identifying the trade activity of EUTL
exchange clearing accounts (Martino and Trotignon (2013)), but since most Phase I trade took place
OTC, this identiﬁcation would capture a small share of futures trades).
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tion) whereby exchanges of allowance ownership can be cancelled. EUTL transactions
are allowance ownership exchanges, which must have been beneﬁcial to both transacting
parties. We therefore assume that these EUTL transactions are spot trades. But without
the initiated and intermediated transactions, the net beneﬁts of the "unobserved" obser-
vations (i.e. the latent demand) cannot be estimated. As inferences on the ﬁrms' decision
to trade are diﬃcult to make, we are limited in estimating the volume and sign of the
observed transactions only.39 This further implies that dynamic panel data approaches
would be of limited use (e.g. to capture delayed carbon or energy market shocks).
Appendix A.3. Construction of ENDOW-indicator
Table I lists the variables for ENDOWi. Through these variables, we aim to capture
the extent to which ﬁrms are endowed, and thus able to ﬂexibly adjust their carbon-
intensity. GINIFUEL04i and GINIFUEL09i, are variants to the well-known GINI-
coeﬃcient.40 It ranges from zero (one) for an equally (unequally) spread fuel type distri-
bution. Besides BROWNi,t, this GINI-distribution is based on three other fuel input cat-
egories (as available in Carma.org): HYDROi,t, NUCLEARi,t, and RENEWABLEi,t.
These categories are proportions which sum up to one. Furthermore, GINISECTORi
ranges from zero (one) for an equal (unequal) intra-conglomerate producer type distribu-
tion. These suppliers are categorized via the industries: gas, coal, uranium mining and
processing, petroleum, and "other".
Composite indicators capture the variance of the variables they are composed of.
Through factor analysis, indices can be constructed from a "number of variables [...] by
describing linear combinations [called: factors] of the variables that contain most of the
information [i.e. the variance]" (StataCorp (2011)). Since weights (or: 'loadings') on the
39If the decisions to trade are separate from the decisions what amounts to exchange, estimates would
be inconsistent if the decision to trade is not random. We estimated the likelihood of allowance trade
via a (panel data) approach from Semykina and Wooldrige (2010). The inverse Mills ratios were jointly
insigniﬁcant. It is not clear-cut, however, which variables aﬀect the trade decision as they may impact
the amounts decision as well.
40The "04" and "09" for GINIFUEL are related to Carma.org, which only provides details over
2004, 2009, and "future" (cf. Section Appendix A.1)
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variables diﬀer, increases in one variable may translate into higher ENDOWi-values than
for others. 41
ENDOWi was calculated for two separate subsets based on ELECi (cf. Section 3.1),
so that the index for electricity ﬁrms is based on more variables. Table A.I contains
the principal factors (panel A), and the factor loadings with its unique variances (panel
B).42 Panel A shows that the electricity and non-electricity ﬁrms' eigenvalues (EV) of
the fourth and ﬁrst factor are less than one, respectively. The corresponding numbers
of factors have therefore been selected.4344 Panel B contains the factor loadings; the
coeﬃcients that make up the above mentioned linear combinations. For the electricity
ﬁrms, the second factor (F2) was selected. It explained less than factor 1 (a 7% diﬀerence),
but its coeﬃcients were more in line with the theory. Autarkic ﬁrms are expected to have
lower Gini-factors, while the other factors are expected to be positively related. Also the
factor 1 (F1) loadings for non-electricity ﬁrms are in line with the theory.
After standardizing the index values, the two subsets were merged into one overall
index. Since the indicator variable is negative for some but positive for others, the
index-values were min-max normalized. We subsequently set up the dummy (ENDOWi)
equalling 1 for ﬁrms with index-values above the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
41Composite indicators are typically constructed via Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Factor
Analysis. Among Factor Analysis methods, "Principal factoring with iterated communalities (IPF)
identiﬁes the underlying dimensions that best account for the pattern of correlations between variables"
(Hamilton (2013)). As the variables are correlated (not shown here) and PCA does not take up inter-
variable 'communalities', we selected IPF as the factor analysis method.
42The variables from both subsets were checked whether they have enough in common, so that a
factor model would be warranted. Only for the non-electricity ﬁrms do a couple of variables have
low squared multiple correlations values, warranting possible exclusion. However, both subsets have
"middling" Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values, and both subsets' anti-image correlation coeﬃcients are low.
Low-dimensional reduction of the data would thus be possible.
43Iterated principal factors estimations depend on the number of retained factors.
44Indeed, the values of 1 in the proportion column ("Prop.") indicate that these factors result in a
full coverage of the variance.
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Appendix A.4. Details on the trade frequency and autarky clusters
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of ﬁrms over the categories of trade frequency
(the x-axes) and autarky (the y-axes). Diﬀerences between the box-and-whisker plots
are smallest with ENDOWi in Panels A and B. SIZEi may therefore provide a better
subgroup clustering. Moreover, Panel C shows the (non-)dispersed traders are large
(small), while Panel D shows the (non-)electricity ﬁrms are small (large). And, among
electricity ﬁrms, 68% are dispersed and 32% are non-dispersed traders, while among
non-electricity ﬁrms, 43% are dispersed and 57% are non-dispersed traders.
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Figure A.1: Box-and-whisker plots on the distribution of energy ﬁrms over the subsets (ELECi and
DISPi) and interaction terms (ENDOWi and SIZEi).
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Table I: Overview and description of the variables
Variable used in the empirical analysis
TRADE? Daily net allowance trade (cf. Equation 2)
LCT ? ; LCT 2? Lagged compliance trajectory LCTi,t (cf. Equation 4) ; (LCTi,t)
2
EDEM• ln(monthly demand for national electricity (in MWh))
∆FEDEM•i,t ln(next month EDEMi,t)-ln(current month EDEMi,t)
∆LEDEM•i,t ln(current month EDEMi,t)-ln(previous month EDEMi,t)
BROWN? Firm's (national) MWh production by fossil fuels (in %)
COAL Global Coal New Castle Price Index
GAS London Natural Gas Price Index
SPREAD? Coal-gas price returns: ln(COALt −GASt)
BSPREAD? Weighted coal-gas price returns: BROWNi,t ∗ ln(COALt −GASt)
BDINDEX? Bi-directional index (cf. Equation 3)
BSS Buy-and-Sell Signal: CO2SPOTt - 30 day CO2SPOTt moving avg
CCA Cost of Carry Arbitrage: CO2FUTt − CO2SPOTt ∗ erT
where r equals the daily 1-month EURIBOR rate
CO2FUT  ICE Phase I average continuous futures CO2 price
CO2SPOT  EEX-EU CO2 settlement (spot) price
SAMEGUO? Daily average of dummy: 1 if trade partner belongs to same Global
Ultimate Owner (GUO), 0 otherwise (GUOs have ≥ 50,01% of shares)
DISP ◦ 1 if RTAi > sample quantile, 0 otherwise, where
RTAi = (
1
T
∑T
t=1 PURCHit + SELLit)/(
∑T
t=1 PURCHit + SELLit)
ELEC◦ 1 if controls at least one electricity installation, and 0 otherwise
ENDOW ◦ 1 if ENDOWi (cf. Appendix A.3) > sample quantile, 0 otherwise
SIZE◦ 1 if ln(total assets 2004-2009 average) > sample quantile, 0 otherwise
Variables underlying the ENDOWi composite indicator
CARB05◦ - Firm's national tCO2 emissions / national electricity MWh production
CARB07◦ over 2005, 2006, and 2007
DOM(FOR)◦ # Domestic (foreign) intra-conglomerate installations
(N)ECON◦ # Intra-conglomerate electricity ﬁrms (domestic and foreign)
GSECTOR◦ Gini-equality on spread of within-GUO industry categories (footnote 9)
GFUEL04(09)◦ Gini-equality on spread of within-GUO fuel categories in 2004 (2009)
(BROWNi,t +HYDROi,t +NUCLEARi,t +RENEWABLEi,t = 1)
MSHARE◦ Average 2004, 2009 (%)-market share national MWh electricity production
The variables are grouped according to the methodology subsections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5), and 3.6,
and include the variables used for the composite indicator, ENDOWi. The following symbols
indicate the unit-frequency: ◦ = ﬁrm/constant; ? = ﬁrm/trading day; • = country/monthly; 
= EU-wide/trading day.
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Table II: Statistics on determinants clustered by autarky and trade frequency: part I
Elec. prod. Non-elec. prod. Disp. traders Non-disp. traders
Variable Stat. ENDOW SIZE ENDOW SIZE ENDOW SIZE ENDOW SIZE
TRADE mean −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.04 −0.01 −0.01
sd 1.64 0.67 0.95 0.63 1.63 0.92 0.47 0.46
TRADE mean 0.05 0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 −0.01 −0.01
sd 1.97 2.06 1.04 1.35 1.96 2.05 0.46 0.48
LCT mean 1.81 1.69 3.64 2.99 1.96 1.19 4.21 3.48
sd 12.50 10.01 9.99 9.30 12.30 10.64 9.01 8.75
LCT mean 3.09 2.77 2.37 3.19 1.99 2.29 3.41 4.58
sd 12.24 13.01 10.33 11.28 12.47 13.01 9.19 9.73
LCT^2 mean 159.48 103.05 113.08 95.48 155.22 114.58 98.88 88.71
sd 65.02 45.67 55.86 40.85 61.57 43.36 49.17 38.46
LCT^2 mean 159.22 176.91 112.36 137.47 159.41 174.40 96.13 115.59
sd 77.56 69.93 55.52 64.18 69.17 65.14 49.86 62.67
BSPREADmean 2.51 2.61 0 0 1.06 0.41 0.41 0.45
sd 1.41 1.42 0 0 1.55 1.12 1.08 1.15
BSPREADmean 2.63 2.56 0 0 1.21 1.42 0.76 0.81
sd 1.340 1.36 0 0 1.57 1.62 1.42 1.43
SPREAD mean 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78
sd 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
SPREAD mean 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78
sd 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
∆LEDEM mean −0.01 −0.01 −0.004 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.003 −0.004
sd 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09
∆LEDEM mean −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.004 −0.01 −0.01 −0.004 −0.004
sd 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.10
EDEM mean 9.71 9.66 9.32 9.37 9.63 9.50 9.25 9.38
sd 1.27 1.33 1.17 1.16 1.28 1.37 1.12 1.11
EDEM mean 9.93 9.89 9.62 9.58 9.80 9.80 9.67 9.57
sd 1.24 1.23 1.17 1.20 1.26 1.22 1.14 1.22
∆FEDEM mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.01
sd 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08
∆FEDEM mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
sd 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.092 0.08 0.09
The two upper (lower) rows of the variables contain the means and standard deviations
(sd) of the less (more) endowed or small (large) ﬁrms.
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Table III: Statistics on determinants clustered by autarky and trade frequency: part II
Elec. prod. Non elec. prod. Disp. traders Non-disp. traders
Variable Stat. ENDOW SIZE ENDOW SIZE ENDOW SIZE ENDOW SIZE
BDINDEX mean 0.01 −0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.01 −0.004 0.002 −0.001
sd 0.25 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.05
BDINDEX mean 0.02 0.02 −0.001 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.01
sd 0.31 0.32 0.15 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.11 0.17
BSS mean −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16
sd 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
BSS mean −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16
sd 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
CCA mean 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
sd 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
CCA mean 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
sd 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
SAMEGUOmean 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02
sd 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.13
SAMEGUOmean 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02
sd 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.13
The two upper (lower) rows of the variables contain the means and standard deviations
(sd) of the less (more) endowed or small (large) ﬁrms.
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Table IV: Panel data regressions on TRADEi,t
ENDOW SIZE
Variable Disp◦ Non-disp• Elec• Non-elec◦ Disp◦ Non-disp• Elec• Non-elec◦
1a) ENDOW 0.000 −0.399* 1.564* 0.000
2a) SIZE −0.186 −1.832* 0.791* −0.226*
3a) LCT 0.000 −0.001* −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
4a) LCT^2 0.000 0.000* −0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* −0.001* 0.001*
5a) BSPREAD 0.014 0.000 −0.015* 0.000 0.041* 0.001 −0.008* 0.000
6a) SPREAD 0.021 0.020* 0.077* −0.018 0.009 0.021* 0.097* −0.028
7a) ∆LEDEM 0.030 0.008 −0.003 −0.004 −0.037 0.025 −0.073 0.017
8a) EDEM 0.074* 0.002 0.023* 0.015 0.078* 0.000 0.026* 0.027
9a) ∆FEDEM 0.020 −0.003 0.025 0.021 −0.066 0.016 −0.110 0.043
10a) BDINDEX 3.447* 1.685* 2.946* 4.226* 3.336* 0.770* 3.066* 3.086*
11a) BSS 0.000 0.000 −0.005 −0.002 −0.001 −0.012* 0.007 −0.016
12a) CCA 0.013 0.000 −0.009 0.024* −0.004 0.003 −0.024* 0.019*
13a) SAMEGUO −0.678* 3.567* −1.390* 0.767* −0.595* 2.347* −0.925* −0.066
14a) QUARTER1 −0.059* −0.004 −0.068* −0.007 −0.069* −0.001 −0.077* −0.011
15a) QUARTER2 −0.015 0.002 −0.023 −0.004 −0.018 −0.005 −0.008 −0.018*
16a) QUARTER4 −0.030* 0.001 −0.025 −0.005 −0.031* 0.005 −0.013 −0.023*
CONSTANT −0.412 −3.241* −0.568* −0.885* 0.000 −0.578* −0.351* 0.000
3b) LCT −0.001 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
4b) LCT^2 0.001* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* −0.001*
5b) BSPREAD 0.044 0.001 0.021* 0.000 −0.039* −0.002 0.008* 0.000
6b) SPREAD −0.033 −0.006 −0.019 0.002 −0.014 −0.021* −0.096* 0.025
7b) ∆LEDEM −0.111 −0.036 −0.110 −0.011 0.038 −0.034 0.078 −0.024
8b) EDEM −0.051 −0.002 −0.005 −0.011 −0.075* 0.000 −0.026* −0.027
9b) ∆FEDEM −0.138* −0.009 −0.196* −0.027 0.055 −0.028 0.116* −0.057
10b) BDINDEX 0.288* 0.313* 0.562* −0.795* 5.815* 7.603* 6.127* 5.706*
11b) BSS −0.008 −0.010* 0.013 −0.013 0.005 0.013* −0.006 0.017
12b) CCA −0.036* −0.001 −0.022 −0.026* 0.005 −0.004 0.024* −0.019*
13b) SAMEGUO 1.056* −0.357* 1.698* 0.080 0.895* −1.769* 1.274* 0.471*
14b) QUARTER1 0.019 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.068* 0.001 0.075* 0.011
15b) QUARTER2 0.003 −0.003 0.036 −0.012 0.017 0.007 0.008 0.020*
16b) QUARTER4 0.011 0.005 0.023 −0.004 0.027 −0.003 0.007 0.025*
R2 (within) 0.275 0.347 0.248 0.336 0.303 0.648 0.257 0.412
N 353 050 333 402 229 636 456 816 353 050 333 402 229 636 456 816
No. groups 575 543 374 744 575 543 374 744
Methodologies used are ﬁxed eﬀects (within) regressions with Driscoll-Kraay stan-
dard errors (symbol: ◦), and panel-corrected Prais-Winsten standard errors (sym-
bol: •). Values are coeﬃcients, and marked with * if signiﬁcant at 95%. The
variables appended with b) are SIZEi or ENDOWi interactions terms.
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Table V: The p-values from the joint signiﬁcance (Wald) tests on Table IV variables
ENDOW SIZE
Variable Disp. Non-disp. Elec. Non-elec. Disp. Non-disp. Elec. Non-elec.
Wald tests: base and interaction terms of ENDOWi or SIZEi)
Full model (i.e. F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCT, LCT^2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00
BSPREAD, SPREAD 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.12
EDEM, LAG- & FUT- 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.90 0.04 0.33 0.00 0.14
BDINDEX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BSS 0.75 0.03 0.79 0.02 0.20 0.08 0.80 0.04
CCA 0.02 0.91 0.02 0.004 0.53 0.45 0.09 0.07
SAMEGUO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
QUARTER dummies 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.001 0.09 0.00 0.01
Wald tests: only interaction terms of ENDOWi or SIZEi)
Full model 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LCT, LCT^2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00
BSPREAD, SPREAD 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.03
EDEM, LAG- & FUT- 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04
BDINDEX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BSS 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.02
CCA 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.02
SAMEGUO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
QUARTER dummies 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.02
34
Thijs Jong and Alexander C.M. Zeitlberger
Table A.I: Autarky index: ENDOWi
Electricity ﬁrms Non-electricity ﬁrms
A EV. Diﬀ. Prop. Cum. EV Diﬀ. Prop. Cum.
Factor1 3.50 0.53 0.47 0.47 2.20 1.86 1 1
Factor2 2.97 1.98 0.40 0.87 0.34 0.25 0.15 1.15
Factor3 0.996 0.74 0.13 1 0.09 0.24 0.04 1.20
Factor4 0.25 0.10 0.03 1.03 −0.15 0.13 −0.07 1.13
Factor5 0.16 0.16 0.02 1.06 −0.28 n.a. −0.13 1
Factor6 0.00 0.00 0 1.06
Factor7 0.00 0.02 0 1.06
Factor8 −0.02 0.04 0.00 1.05
Factor9 −0.07 0.04 −0.01 1.04
Factor10 −0.10 0.12 −0.01 1.03
Factor11 −0.22 n.a. −0.0299 1
B F1 F2 F3 Uniq. F1 Uniq.
DOM 0.38 0.10 −0.04 0.84 0.22 0.95
FOR 0.75 0.19 0.24 0.35 0.84 0.29
ECON 0.86 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.89 0.20
NECON 0.75 0.23 0.51 0.12 0.72 0.48
GSECTOR−0.22 −0.11 −0.24 0.88 −0.35 0.88
GFUEL04 −0.75 −0.14 0.58 0.07
GFUEL09 −0.71 −0.13 0.43 0.29
MSHARE 0.38 0.07 −0.19 0.81
CARB05 −0.27 0.96 −0.03 0.001
CARB06 −0.27 0.96 −0.03 0.00
CARB07 −0.27 0.96 −0.03 0.001
Panel A contains the iterated principal factors (unrotated), and panel
B the factor loadings and unique variances. The columns contain the
eigenvalues ("EV"), the eigenvalue diﬀerence ("Diﬀ."), the variance pro-
portion ("Prop."), cumulative variance proportion ("Cum."), uniqueness
("Uniq."), and factors 1 to 3 (F1-F3).
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